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W. Michael Reisman*
American judges, seised of a case requiring them to appraise, under
international law, a foreign government's acts, have few attractive options.
If they routinely agree to decide these cases, the political costs to the
Executive of conducting foreign affairs could increase, sometimes criti-
cally. If they routinely refuse these cases, plaintiffs are denied judicial
protection. If they follow Executive instructions on a case-by-case basis,
judicial independence suffers. It is a dilemma for courts and a continuing
uncertainty for users and students of international law. Nowhere has it
been more searchingly-if not successfully-explored than in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.'
From the John Marshall era on,2 judges have recognized that inter-
national politics may require ducking some cases. A unanimous decision
of the Court elevated this to a doctrine of "Act of State": "Every sovereign
State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State,
and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory."' As for those who
suffered those acts, discretionary Executive espousal at the diplomatic level
was to substitute for a day in court.
Sabbatino explored alternative architectural solutions to the problem
arising when foreign governments violate international law. Writing for
a majority of eight, John Marshall Harlan effectively refashioned Act of
State. International law, in his view, was indifferent with respect to the
doctrine. Neither reviewing nor giving effect to a foreign government's act
would violate international law, whether or not the act itself violated
international law. Nor did the Constitution require an Act of State
doctrine. There were, however, constitutional considerations stemming
from the separation of powers between "dissimilar institutions"4 with
different competencies to make and implement different kinds of inter-
national decisions. Harlan detected, in prior decisions, a "strong sense of
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the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the
validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this
country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations
as a whole in the international sphere."'
These not entirely compatible policy considerations led Harlan to rest
the role of the Court in cases calling for review of the lawfulness of
foreign governmental acts on two tests: the degree of codification or
consensus of the particular international norm to be applied and the degree
of triviality of the foreign policy issue involved-de maximis non curat
praetor. Henceforth,
the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of
property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government,
extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the
absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding con-
trolling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking
violates customary international law.6
In Sabbatino the Court found, far from consensus, a profound
ideological divergence between capital-importing and exporting states
regarding expropriation and compensation. Courts could not contribute
much to consensus formation, for their determinations would be at best
occasional. But courts could impede negotiations by the Executive on
behalf of all other members of the effected class. Whatever the courts
decided would be unhelpful: approving the foreign action would undercut
the State Department's position; condemning it might deprive the Depart-
ment of bargaining flexibility; and deficits for the American role as a world
trade entrepot might ensue.
Harlan was willing to accommodate Executive representations that
judgment might impede United States diplomacy. But he recoiled from
requiring explicit statements: "Adverse domestic consequences might flow
from an official stand which could be assuaged, if at all, only by revealing
matters best kept secret." 7 As a result, foreign acts incompatible with
international law could be treated as valid and plaintiffs were referred to
the Executive for diplomatic action.
Byron White's solitary dissent actually shared many of Harlan's
premises and conclusions! "[C]ourts," in White's view, "have never
been bound to pay unlimited deference to foreign acts of state,"9 though
5. Id.
6. Id. at 428.
7. Id. at 436.
8. Harlan surely agreed, for example, that international law must sustain stable expectations for
commerce to flourish. Id. at 459-60 (White, J., dissenting). The question was simply which branch
should have responsibility for securing those expectations.
9. Id. at 449 (White, I., dissenting).
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he acknowledged a continuing "attitude of caution and self-imposed
restraint in dealing with the laws of a foreign nation." 0 Harlan would
not have quarrelled with this nor with White's general proposition that
principles of international law-a "consensus among civilized nations on
the proper ordering of relations between nations and the citizens thereof"-
have been applied by U.S. courts "whenever international law is con-
trolling."" Harlan simply wanted black-letter confirmation that the
foreign government was part of that consensus. He assumed no current
consensus on rules regarding expropriation, while White felt that question
should be investigated. But factual differences aside, White agreed that in
"unsettled areas of international law," "[w]here a clear violation of
international law is not demonstrated,... principles of comity underlying
the act of state doctrine warrant recognition and enforcement of the foreign
act. "12
White demonstrated that Harlan's bias against custom and insistence
on a written agreement expressing the governing rules was inconsistent and
illogical, for much of Harlan's argument incorporated custom. But White
did not come to grips with Harlan's reason for insisting on a prior written
agreement; preexisting and independent authorizations for review of the
foreign act obviated ad hoc Executive authorizations that, in themselves,
subordinated the Judiciary.
This central difference between majority and dissent is narrower than
it might appear, for White was at least as deferential to the foreign affairs
responsibilities of the Executive Branch as Harlan. Indeed, White
unequivocally superordinated an Executive's determination as to whether
international law should be applied to a particular case. But "a blanket
presumption of nonreview in each case is inappropriate and a requirement
that the State Department render a determination after reasonable notice,
in each case, is necessary." 3
White specified three contingencies for non-review. One was wholly
noncontroversial: a certification by the State Department that there was or
soon would be an adequate lis alibi pendens. A second was wholly
nonidealistic: "whether a friendly foreign sovereign is involved" 4-- as the
Spanish adage puts it, "Para mis amigos, todo; para mis enemigos, la ley!"
White's primary and significant contingency was entirely discretionary:
"whether adjudication would 'vex the peace of nations.'"' 5 Because
White would not require "a full statement of reasons," but would "accord
10. Id. at 442 (White, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 453 (White, I., dissenting).
12. Id. at 458 (White, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 468 (White, I., dissenting).
14. Id. (White, I., dissenting).
15. Id. (White, I., dissenting) (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 304 (1897)).
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16considerable deference" to partial reasons, the vexing of the peace of
nations contingency seems to mean that whenever the Executive wishes,
courts will abstain.
The difference between Harlan and White is thus very fine. The
majority had been willing to discharge the Executive from making an
explicit request because "[a]dverse domestic consequences might flow from
an official stand."' 7 White was unwilling to extend the "vexing"
exception to mean "that it might be politically embarrassing on the
domestic front for the Department of State to interpose an objection in a
particular case which has attracted public attention" because "it is not fair
to allow the fate of a litigant to turn on the possible political
embarrassment of the Department."" 8 But the breadth of White's excep-
tion and the absence of rigorous review would cover any Executive
concerns.
Harlan's doctrine was supposed to avoid embarrassing the Executive
while protecting the independence of the Court. Plaintiffs suffered.
White, more concerned with providing opportunities for citizens to have
their day in court, would still have suspended jurisdiction if the Executive
murmured "vexatious." He accepted, without discomfort, the super-
ordination of the Executive in foreign affairs matters if that was the price
of providing as much justice as possible in individual cases. Neither
thought our courts had a proper international role that might hold the
Executive to an international legal standard.
Sabbatino ignited angry responses and vigorous lobbying 9
Congress purported to overrule it, enjoining courts to take jurisdiction in
Sabbatino-type cases and stipulating the international law standard.' In
subsequent cases, individual judges on the Court tried to slip from Harlan's
mortmain, but the most they could do was change the outcome of the cases
at bar, without impairing Sabbatino.2"
16. Id. (White, I., dissenting).
17. Id. at 436.
18. Id. at 468-69 (White, J., dissenting).
19. See, e.g., Kojo Yelpaala, Strategy and Planning in Global Product Distribution-Beyond the
Distribution Contract, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 839, 892 n.168 (1994) (describing legislative
attempts to undo the effects of the "unpopular" Sabbatino decision).
20. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1990) (originally enacted as part of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961).
21. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706 (1976) (White, J.)
("Justice Harlan's observations in Sabbatino concerning the limitation of the judicial function in relation
to the making of foreign policy remain unimpeachable."); First Nat'1 City Bank v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.) (holding that "where the Executive
Branch .. . expressly represents to the Court that application of the act of state doctrine
would not advance the interests of American foreign policy, that doctrine should not be
applied by the courts").
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With the collapse of Marxism and the virtual universalization of the
market model under the not always benign supervision of the Bretton
Woods agencies, there is much more consensus now on the law of
expropriation. There is more and more foreign investment and many
international conflicts. With the reduction of the scope of foreign
sovereign immunity,' more Act-of-State-type cases are likely to arise.
The Court does not seem inclined to review Sabbatino. Are we left, then,
with an approach that preserves a formal but empty judicial independence
at the constitutional level, while substantially reducing the justice courts
afford plaintiffs when foreign governments violate their rights?
22. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1988).
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